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  1. Home
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  3. Epicurus on Freedom
  • Cited by 18
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
September 2009
Print publication year:
2005
Online ISBN:
9780511482571
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511482571
Subjects:
Classical Studies, Classical Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Philosophy
Information

Book description

In this 2005 book, Tim O'Keefe reconstructs the theory of freedom of the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus (341–271/0 BCE). Epicurus' theory has attracted much interest, but our attempts to understand it have been hampered by reading it anachronistically as the discovery of the modern problem of free will and determinism. O'Keefe argues that the sort of freedom which Epicurus wanted to preserve is significantly different from the 'free will' which philosophers debate today, and that in its emphasis on rational action it has much closer affinities with Aristotle's thought than with current preoccupations. His original and provocative book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in Hellenistic philosophy.

Reviews

'The book makes an important contribution to scholarship and deserves to be read carefully by all who work in this field.'

Source: British Journal of the History of Philosophy

'… a benchmark for everyone who wants to become familiar with the arguments and wants to develop them further. It is bound to play a fundamental role in current debates about the problem of free will and determinism in Epicurean philosophy.'

Source: Rhizai

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Contents

Contents
References
References
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