## POLI21203: Rational Choice and Politics



[1]

A. H. Birch 1975. Economic Models in Political Science: The Case of 'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty'. British Journal of Political Science. 5, 1 (1975), 69–82.

[2]

Adelman, J. 2013. Worldly philosopher: the odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman. Princeton University Press.

[3]

Alan Carling 1988. Liberty, Equality, Community. New Left Review. 171, (1988).

[4]

Axelrod, R. 1990. The Evolution of Cooperation. The evolution of cooperation. Penguin Books. 3–24.

[5]

Becker, G. 1986. The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour. Rational choice. Basil Blackwell. 108–122.

[6]

Binmore, K.G. 2007. Getting Locked In. Playing for real: a text on game theory. Oxford University Press.

[7]

Blais, A. 2000. To vote or not to vote?: the merits and limits of rational choice theory. University of Pittsburgh Press.

[8]

Brennan, G. and Lomasky, L. 1985. The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington: Toward a Smithian Theory of Electoral Behavior. Economics and Philosophy. 1, 02 (1985). DOI:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267100002467.

[9]

Buchanan, J.M. et al. 1978. The consequences of Mr Keynes: an analysis of the misuse of economic theory for political profiteering, with proposals for constitutional disciplines. Institute of Economic Affairs.

[10]

Buchanan, J.M. and Tollison, R.D. 1984. The Theory of public choice--II. University of Michigan Press.

[11]

Carling, A.H. 1991. Chicken, Gender, Class. Social division. Verso. 253-271.

[12]

Chong, D. 1991. Collective action and the civil rights movement. University of Chicago Press.

[13]

Chong, D. 1991. Collective action and the civil rights movement. University of Chicago Press.

[14]

Dodge, R.V. 2012. The Prisoner's Dilemma. Schelling's game theory: how to make decisions. Oxford University Press. 137–146.

[15]

Does 'Democracy in Chains' paint an accurate picture of James Buchanan? [with updates] - The Washington Post:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/28/does-democracy-in-chains-paint-an-accurate-picture-of-james-buchanan/?utm term=.219bdf80030f.

[16]

Dowding, K. et al. 2000. Exit, voice and loyalty: Analytic and empirical developments. European Journal of Political Research. 37, 4 (2000), 469–495.

[17]

Dowding, K. 2005. Is it Rational to Vote? Five Types of Answer and a Suggestion. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 7, 3 (2005), 442–459. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2005.00188.x.

[18]

Downs, A. 1957. An economic theory of democracy. Harper and Row.

[19]

Downs, A. 1957. An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. Journal of Political Economy. 65, 2 (1957), 135–150.

[20]

Dunleavy, P. 1985. Bureaucrats, Budgets and the Growth of the State: Reconstructing an Instrumental Model. British Journal of Political Science. 15, 03 (1985). DOI:https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712340000421X.

[21]

Dunleavy, P. 2013. Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice: economic explanations in political science. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

[22]

Green, D. and Shapiro, I. 1994. Methodological Pathologies. Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science. Yale University Press. 33–46.

[23]

Heffernan, R. 2001. New Labour and Thatcherism: political change in Britain. Palgrave.

[24]

Hindmoor, A. 2005. Reading Downs: New Labour and. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 7, 3 (2005), 402–417. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2005.00186.x.

[25]

Hindmoor, A. and Taylor, B. 2015. Rational choice. Palgrave Macmillan.

[26]

Hindmoor, A. and Taylor, B. 2015. Rational choice. Palgrave Macmillan.

[27]

Hindmoor, A. and Taylor, B. 2015. Rational choice. Palgrave Macmillan.

[28]

Hindmoor, A. and Taylor, B. 2015. Rational choice. Palgrave Macmillan.

[29]

Hindmoor, A. and Taylor, B. 2015. Rational choice. Palgrave Macmillan.

[30]

Hindmoor, A. and Taylor, B. 2015. Rational choice. Palgrave Macmillan.

[31]

Hindmoor, A. and Taylor, B. 2015. Rational choice. Palgrave Macmillan.

[32]

Hindmoor, Andrew 2011. 'Major Combat Operations Have Ended'? Arguing about Rational Choice. British Journal of Political Science. 41, 1 (2011), 191–210.

[33]

Hirschman, A.O. 1995. Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic. A propensity to self-subversion. Harvard University Press. 9–44.

[34]

Hirschman, A.O. 1982. Shifting involvements: private interest and public action. Martin Robertson.

[35]

Irrational exuberance: when did political science forget about politics? | New Republic: https://newrepublic.com/article/78956/political-science-irrational-exuberance.

[36]

Laver, M. 1997. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. Sage.

[37]

Laver, M. 1997. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. Sage.

[38]

Laver, M. 1997. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. Sage.

[39]

Laver, M. 1997. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. Sage.

[40]

Laver, M. 1997. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. Sage.

[41]

Laver, M. 1997. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. Sage.

[42]

Laver, M. 1997. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. Sage.

[43]

MacLean, N. 2017. Democracy in chains: the deep history of the radical right's stealth plan for America. Scribe.

[44]

MacLean, N. 2017. Democracy in chains: the deep history of the radical right's stealth plan

for America. Scribe.

[45]

McLean, I. 1987. How People (And Animals) Cooperate. Public choice: an introduction. Basil Blackwell. 125–148.

[46]

McLean, I. 1987. Public choice: an introduction. Basil Blackwell.

[47]

Mclean, Iain 2000. Review article: The divided legacy of Mancur Olson. British Journal of Political Science. 30, 4 (2000), 651–668.

[48]

Monroe, K. 1991. The Theory of Rational Action: Its Origins and Usefulness for Political Science. The Economic approach to politics: a critical reassessment of the theory of rational action. HarperCollins Publishers. 1–32.

[49]

Northcott, R. and Alexandrova, A. 2015. Prisoner's Dilemma doesn't explain much. The prisoner's dilemma. M. Peterson, ed. Cambridge University Press. 64–83.

[50]

Olson, M. 1989. Collective Action. The invisible hand. M. Milgate and P. Newman, eds. Macmillan Reference. 61–69.

[51]

Olson, M. 1971. The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Harvard University Press.

[52]

Parsons, S. 2006. The Rationality of Voting: A Response to Dowding. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 8, 2 (2006), 295–298. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2006.00215.x.

[53]

Parsons, S.D. 2005. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. Continuum.

[54]

Parsons, S.D. 2005. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. Continuum.

[55]

Parsons, S.D. 2005. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. Continuum.

[56]

Parsons, S.D. 2005. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. Continuum.

[57]

Parsons, S.D. 2005. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. Continuum.

[58]

Parsons, S.D. 2005. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. Continuum.

[59]

Parsons, S.D. 2005. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. Continuum.

[60]

Peterson, M. 2015. The Prisoner's Dilemma. Cambridge University Press.

[61]

Poundstone, W. 1993. Prisoner's dilemma. Anchor Books.

[62]

Poundstone, W. 1993. Prisoner's dilemma. Oxford University Press.

[63]

Poundstone, W. 1993. Prisoner's Dilemma. Prisoner's dilemma. Oxford University Press. 195–213.

[64]

'Rules Rather than Discretion: the Inconsistency of Optimal Plans', Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 83, no. 3, 1977, pp. 473-91: https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/research/prescott/papers/rulesdiscretion.pdf?la=en.

[65]

Schelling, T.C. 1978. Thermostats, Lemons and other Families of Models. Micromotives and macrobehavior. Norton. 81–133.

[66]

Schotter, A. 1990. Free market economics: a critical appraisal. Basil Blackwell.

[67]

Tsebelis, G. 1990. Nested games: rational choice in comparative politics. University of California Press.

[68]

Wickham-Jones, M. 1995. 'Anticipating Social Democracy, Pre-empting Anticipations Economic-Policy-Making in the British Labour Party, 1987-1992'. Politics and society. 23, (1995), 465–494.

[69]

Wickham-Jones, M. 1995. Rationality, Revolution, and Reassurance. Preferences, institutions, and rational choice. Clarendon Press. 249–265.

[70]

1989. Prisoners Dilemma. Game theory. Macmillan. 199-204.

[71]

1992. Rival views of Market society. Rival views of market society, and other recent essays . Harvard University Press. 77–101.

[72]

1991. Selective Social Incentives and Reputational Concerns. Collective action and the civil rights movement. University of Chicago Press. 31–72.