1
Welcome – Blackboard Learn. https://www.ole.bris.ac.uk/webapps/portal/execute/tabs/tabAction?tab_tab_group_id=_17_1
2
POLI21203 Unit Summary. https://www.bris.ac.uk/unit-programme-catalogue/UnitDetails.jsa?ayrCode=19/20&unitCode=POLI21203
3
Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. London: : Sage 1997. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393
4
Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice. Second edition. London: : Palgrave Macmillan 2015. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=6234556
5
Parsons S. Rational Choice and Politics : A Critical Introduction. https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction/
6
McLean I. Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: : Basil Blackwell 1987.
7
Chong D. Collective action and the civil rights movement. Chicago: : University of Chicago Press 1991. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=1977975
8
Poundstone W. Prisoner’s dilemma. New York: : Anchor Books 1993.
9
Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. London: : Sage 1997. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393
10
Parsons SD. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. London: : Continuum 2005. https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction
11
Monroe K. The Theory of Rational Action: Its Origins and Usefulness for Political Science. In: The Economic approach to politics: a critical reassessment of the theory of rational action. New York: : HarperCollins Publishers 1991. 1–32.
12
Tsebelis G. Nested games: rational choice in comparative politics. Berkeley: : University of California Press 1990. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=224383
13
Irrational exuberance : when did political science forget about politics? | New Republic. https://newrepublic.com/article/78956/political-science-irrational-exuberance
14
Becker G. The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour. In: Rational choice. Oxford: : Basil Blackwell 1986. 108–22.
15
Green D, Shapiro I. Methodological Pathologies. In: Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science. New Haven: : Yale University Press 1994. 33–46.https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=3421286
16
Hindmoor, Andrew. ‘Major Combat Operations Have Ended’? Arguing about Rational Choice. British Journal of Political Science 2011;41:191–210.http://www.jstor.org/stable/41241646
17
MacLean N. Democracy in chains: the deep history of the radical right’s stealth plan for America. Melbourne: : Scribe 2017.
18
Adler JH. Does ‘Democracy in Chains’ paint an accurate picture of James Buchanan? [with updates] - The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/28/does-democracy-in-chains-paint-an-accurate-picture-of-james-buchanan/?utm_term=.219bdf80030f
19
Buchanan J. An Individualist Theory of the Policy Process. In: Varieties of political theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: : Prentice-Hall 1966.
20
Buchanan J. From Private Preferences to Public Philosophy: The Development of Public Choice. In: The economics of politics. London: : Institute of Economic Affairs 1978.
21
Dunleavy P. Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice: economic explanations in political science. London: : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2013. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315835228
22
Elster J. Intrduction. In: Elster J, ed. Rational choice. Washington Square, New York: : New York University Press 1986.
23
Elster J. Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 1989. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511812255
24
Green DP, Shapiro I. Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science. New Haven: : Yale University Press 1994. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=3421286
25
Hauptmann E. Putting choice before democracy: a critique of rational choice theory. Albany: : State University of New York Press 1996.
26
Lane J-E. The Epistemological Foundations of Public Choice Theory. Scandinavian Political Studies 1990;13:65–82. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1990.tb00105.x
27
Lewin L, Lavery D. Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics. Oxford University Press 1991. doi:10.1093/0198277253.001.0001
28
McLean I. Public choice : an introduction. Oxford: : Basil Blackwell
29
Monroe KR. The heart of altruism: perceptions of a common humanity. Princeton, N.J.: : Princeton University Press 1996.
30
Shepsle KA, Bonchek MS. Analyzing politics: rationality, behavior and institutions. New York: : W.W. Norton 1997.
31
Tullock G, Perlman M, Institute of Economic Affairs. The vote motive: an essay in the economics of politics, with applications to the British economy. [London]: : Institute of Economic Affairs 1976.
32
Udehn L. The limits of public choice: a sociological critique of the economic theory of politics. London: : Routledge 1996.
33
Gambetta D. The Sicilian mafia : the business of private protection. Cambridge, Mass.: : Harvard University Press
34
Greenway J. Deciding factors in British politics : a case-studies approach. London: : Routledge
35
Hargreaves S. The Theory of choice : a critical guide. Oxford: : Blackwell
36
Tsebelis G. Nested Games. University Of California Press 1991. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=224383
37
Sen A. Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory. In: Scientific models and man. Oxford: : Clarendon Press
38
Barry NP. The new right. London: : Croom Helm
39
Bosanquet N. After the New Right. Aldershot: : Dartmouth
40
Dunleavy P, O’Leary B. Theories of the state: the politics of liberal democracy. Basingstoke: : Macmillan Education 1987.
41
Green DG. The new right : the counter-revolution in political, economic and social thought. Brighton: : Wheatsheaf
42
King DS. The new right : politics, markets and citizenship. Basingstoke: : Macmillan Education
43
Elster J. Sour Grapes. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2016. doi:10.1017/CBO9781316494172
44
Elster J. Ulysses and the sirens : studies in rationality and irrationality. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press ; Paris: : Cambridge University Press ; Paris : Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme
45
Democracy in Chains: An interview with author Nancy MacLean | Southern Poverty Law Center. https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/03/08/democracy-chains-interview-author-nancy-maclean
46
Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. London: : Sage 1997. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393
47
Olson M. Collective Action. In: Milgate M, Newman P, eds. The invisible hand. London: : Macmillan Reference 1989. 61–9.
48
Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice. Second edition. London: : Palgrave Macmillan 2015.
49
Parsons SD. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. London: : Continuum 2005. https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction
50
Olson M. The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, Massachusetts: : Harvard University Press 1971. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=4642422
51
McLean I. Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: : Basil Blackwell 1987.
52
Mclean, Iain. Review article: The divided legacy of Mancur Olson. British Journal of Political Science 2000;30:651–68.http://www.jstor.org/stable/194289
53
Dunleavy P. Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice: economic explanations in political science. London: : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2013. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315835228
54
Barry B. Sociologists, economists and democracy. London: : Collier-Macmillan
55
Baumgartner FR, Leech BL. Basic interests: the importance of groups in politics and in political science. Princeton: : Princeton University Press 1998. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483510
56
Boyer MA. International cooperation and public goods : opportunities for the Western Alliance. Baltimore ; London: : Johns Hopkins University Press
57
Chong D. Collective action and the civil rights movement. Chicago: : University of Chicago Press https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=1977975
58
Dunleavy P. Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice : economic explanations in political science. London ; New York: : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315835228
59
Green DP, Shapiro I. Pathologies of rational choice theory : a critique of applications in political science. New Haven ; London: : Yale University Press https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=3421286
60
Hansen JM. The Political Economy of Group Membership. American Political Science Review 1985;79:79–96. doi:10.2307/1956120
61
Hardin R. Collective action. Baltimore ; London: : Johns Hopkins University Press, for Resources for the Future
62
Jordan G, Maloney W. The protest business ? : mobilizing campaign groups. Manchester: : Manchester Unversity Press
63
Laver M. Invitation to politics. Oxford: : Robertson
64
McLean I. Public choice : an introduction. Oxford: : Basil Blackwell
65
Moe TM. The organization of interests : incentives and the internal dynamics of the political interest groups. Chicago ; London: : University of Chicago Press
66
Mueller DC. Public choice II : a revised edition of Public choice. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press
67
Olson M. The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press 2009. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=4642422
68
Olson M. The rise and decline of nations : economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. New Haven ; London: : Yale University Press
69
Reisman David. Theories of collective action. Basingstoke: : Macmillan
70
Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley. Labour’s grass roots : the politics of party membership. Oxford: : Clarendon Press
71
Kenneth A. Analyzing politics : rationality, behavior and institutions. New York ; London: : W.W. Norton
72
Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. London: : Sage 1997. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393
73
Prisoners Dilemma. In: Game theory. Basingstoke: : Macmillan 1989. 199–204.
74
Dodge RV. The Prisoner’s Dilemma. In: Schelling’s game theory: how to make decisions. New York: : Oxford University Press 2012. 137–46. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199857203.003.0012
75
Binmore KG. Getting Locked In. In: Playing for real: a text on game theory. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2007. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0001
76
Schotter A. Free market economics: a critical appraisal. 2nd ed. Oxford: : Basil Blackwell 1990.
77
Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice. Second edition. London: : Palgrave Macmillan 2015.
78
Parsons SD. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. London: : Continuum 2005. https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction
79
Poundstone W. Prisoner’s dilemma. New York: : Anchor Books 1993.
80
Peterson M. The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2015. doi:10.1017/CBO9781107360174.001
81
Boston J. Corporatist Incomes Policies, the Free Rider Problem and the British Labour Government’s Social Contract. In: Organized interests and the state : studies in meso-corporatism. London: : Sage
82
Brennan G, Tullock G. An economic theory of military tactics. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 1982;3:225–42. doi:10.1016/0167-2681(82)90019-1
83
Cohen Y. Radicals, reformers, and reactionaries : the prisoner’s dilemma and the collapse of democracy in Latin America. Chicago ; London: : University of Chicago Press
84
Elster J. Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 1989. https://bris.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812255
85
Lange P. Unions, Workers and Wage Regulation: the Rational Bases of Consent. In: Goldthorpe JH, ed. Order and conflict in contemporary capitalism. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 1984.
86
Lichbach MI. The rebel’s dilemma. Ann Arbor: : University of Michigan Press 1995.
87
McLean I. Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: : Basil Blackwell 1987.
88
Monroe KR. The Economic approach to politics: a critical reassessment of the theory of rational action. New York: : HarperCollins Publishers 1991.
89
Poundstone W. Prisoner’s dilemma. New York: : Anchor Books 1993.
90
Schotter A. Free market economics: a critical appraisal. 2nd ed. Oxford: : Basil Blackwell 1990.
91
Tsebelis G. Nested games: rational choice in comparative politics. Berkeley: : University of California Press 1990. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=224383
92
Colomer JM. Game theory and the transition to democracy: the Spanish model. Aldershot: : Edward Elgar 1995.
93
Morrow JD. Game theory for political scientists. Princeton, N.J.: : Princetown University Press 1994.
94
Heap SH, Varoufakis Y. Game theory: a critical text. 2nd ed. London: : Routledge 2004.
95
Selective Social Incentives and Reputational Concerns. In: Collective action and the civil rights movement. Chicago: : University of Chicago Press 1991. 31–72.https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/reader.action?docID=1977975&ppg=46
96
Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. London: : Sage 1997. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393
97
Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice. Second edition. London: : Palgrave Macmillan 2015.
98
Axelrod R. The Evolution of Cooperation. In: The evolution of cooperation. London: : Penguin Books 1990. 3–24.
99
McLean I. How People (And Animals) Cooperate. In: Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: : Basil Blackwell 1987. 125–48.
100
Poundstone W. Prisoner’s dilemma. New York: : Anchor Books 1993.
101
Northcott R, Alexandrova A. Prisoner’s Dilemma doesn’t explain much. In: Peterson M, ed. The prisoner’s dilemma. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2015. 64–83. doi:10.1017/CBO9781107360174.005
102
Axelrod R. The evolution of cooperation. Revised edition. New York: : Basic Books 2006.
103
Boyer MA. International cooperation and public goods: opportunities for the Western Alliance. Baltimore: : Johns Hopkins University Press 1993.
104
Green DP, Shapiro I. Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science. New Haven: : Yale University Press 1994. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=3421286
105
Hampton J. The Contractarian Explanation of the State. In: Politics and rationality. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 1993.
106
Heap SH. The Theory of choice: a critical guide. Oxford: : Blackwell 1992.
107
Keohane RO. After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton: : Princeton University Press 1984. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=5543821
108
Cook KS, Levi M. The Limits of Rationality. Chicago: : Chicago University Press 1990.
109
Lichbach MI. The rebel’s dilemma. Ann Arbor: : University of Michigan Press 1995.
110
Lichbach MI. The cooperator’s dilemma. Ann Arbor: : The University of Michigan Press 1996.
111
McLean I. Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: : Basil Blackwell 1987.
112
Morrow JD. Game theory for political scientists. Princeton, N.J.: : Princetown University Press 1994.
113
Ostrom E. Governing the Commons. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2015. doi:10.1017/CBO9781316423936
114
Oye KA. Cooperation under anarchy. Princeton: : Princeton University Press 1986.
115
Poundstone W. Prisoner’s dilemma. New York: : Anchor Books 1993.
116
Stein AA. Why nations cooperate: circumstance and choice in international relations. New York: : Cornell University Press 1990.
117
Taylor M, Taylor M. The possibility of cooperation. [Rev. ed]. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 1987.
118
Taylor M. Community, Anarchy and Liberty. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 1982. https://bris.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511607875
119
Taylor M. Three on Collective Action. Comparative Political Studies 1991;24:391–6. doi:10.1177/0010414091024003006
120
Udehn L. The limits of public choice: a sociological critique of the economic theory of politics. London: : Routledge 1996.
121
Garrett Hardin. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 1968;162:1243–8.https://www.jstor.org/stable/1724745
122
Carling AH. Chicken, Gender, Class. In: Social division. London: : Verso 1991. 253–71.
123
Alan Carling. Liberty, Equality, Community. New Left Review 1988;171.https://newleftreview.org/I/171/alan-carling-liberty-equality-community
124
Chong D. Collective action and the civil rights movement. Chicago: : University of Chicago Press 1991. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=1977975
125
Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice. Second edition. London: : Palgrave Macmillan 2015.
126
Poundstone W. Prisoner’s Dilemma. In: Prisoner’s dilemma. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 1993. 195–213.
127
Wickham-Jones M. Rationality, Revolution, and Reassurance. In: Preferences, institutions, and rational choice. Oxford: : Clarendon Press 1995. 249–65.
128
Parsons SD. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. London: : Continuum 2005. https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction
129
Schelling TC. Thermostats, Lemons and other Families of Models. In: Micromotives and macrobehavior. New York: : Norton 1978. 81–133.
130
Taylor M, Taylor M. The possibility of cooperation. [Rev. ed]. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 1987.
131
Taylor M, Ward H. Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision. Political Studies 1982;30:350–70. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1982.tb00545.x
132
Hirschman AO. Exit and Voice. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. London: : Palgrave Macmillan UK 2017. 1–10. doi:10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_621-2
133
Hirschman AO. Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History. World Politics 1993;45:173–202. doi:10.2307/2950657
134
A. H. Birch. Economic Models in Political Science: The Case of ‘Exit, Voice, and Loyalty’. British Journal of Political Science 1975;5:69–82.https://www.jstor.org/stable/193274
135
Dowding K, John P, Mergoupis T, et al. Exit, voice and loyalty: Analytic and empirical developments. European Journal of Political Research 2000;37:469–95.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-6765.00522/pdf
136
Chong D. Collective action and the civil rights movement. Chicago: : University of Chicago Press 1991. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=1977975
137
Hirschman AO. Shifting involvements: private interest and public action. Oxford: : Martin Robertson 1982.
138
Adelman J. Worldly philosopher: the odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman. Princeton: : Princeton University Press 2013. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=1108130
139
Taylor M. Rationality and revolution. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 1987.
140
Barry B. Review article - Exit, Voice and Loyalty. British Journal of Political Science 1974;4:79–107.https://www.jstor.org/stable/193628
141
Foxley A, McPherson MS, O’Donnell G, et al. Development, democracy and the art of trespassing: essays in honor of Albert O. Hirschman. Notre Dame: : Published for the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies by University of Notre Dame Press 1986.
142
Freeman RB, Medoff JL. What do unions do? New York: : Basic Books 1984.
143
Hirschman AO. Exit, voice, and loyalty: responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. Cambridge, Mass: : Harvard University Press 1970.
144
Hirschman AO. Essays in trespassing: economics to politics and beyond. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 1981.
145
Hirschman AO. Exit and Voice. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. London: : Palgrave Macmillan UK 2017. 1–10. doi:10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_621-2
146
Michael Laver. ‘Exit, Voice, and Loyalty’ Revisited: The Strategic Production and Consumption of Public and Private Goods. British Journal of Political Science 1976;6:463–82.https://www.jstor.org/stable/193283
147
Allen Buchanan. Revolutionary Motivation and Rationality. Philosophy & Public Affairs 1979;9:59–82.https://www.jstor.org/stable/2264867
148
Hirschman AO. Shifting involvements: private interest and public action. Oxford: : Martin Robertson 1982.
149
Lichbach MI. The rebel’s dilemma. Ann Arbor: : University of Michigan Press 1995.
150
Parsons SD. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. London: : Continuum 2005. https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction/
151
Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. London: : Sage 1997. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393
152
Dowding K. Is it Rational to Vote? Five Types of Answer and a Suggestion. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2005;7:442–59. doi:10.1111/j.1467-856X.2005.00188.x
153
Blais A. To vote or not to vote?: the merits and limits of rational choice theory. Pittsburgh, Pa: : University of Pittsburgh Press 2000.
154
Brennan G, Lomasky L. The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington: Toward a Smithian Theory of Electoral Behavior. Economics and Philosophy 1985;1. doi:10.1017/S0266267100002467
155
Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice. Second edition. London: : Palgrave Macmillan 2015.
156
Parsons S. The Rationality of Voting: A Response to Dowding. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2006;8:295–8. doi:10.1111/j.1467-856x.2006.00215.x
157
Parsons SD. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. London: : Continuum 2005. https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction
158
Dowding K. The ‘D-Term’: A Reply to Stephen Parsons. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2006;8:299–302. doi:10.1111/j.1467-856x.2006.00214.x
159
Barry B. Sociologists, economists and democracy. London: : Collier-Macmillan 1970.
160
Brennan G, Lomasky L. The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington: Toward a Smithian Theory of Electoral Behavior. Economics and Philosophy 1985;1. doi:10.1017/S0266267100002467
161
Brennan G, Lomasky L, editors. Democracy and decision. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 1993. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139173544
162
Keith M Dowding. Preferences, institutions, and rational choice / edited by Keith Dowding and Desmond King. Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York: : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press
163
Anthony. Downs. An economic theory of democracy / [by] Anthony Downs. New York: : Harper and Row
164
Dunleav P. Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice. Routledge Ltd 2014. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315835228
165
Goodin RE, Roberts KWS. The Ethical Voter. American Political Science Review 1975;69:926–8. doi:10.2307/1958406
166
Green DP, Shapiro I. Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science. New Haven: : Yale University Press 1994. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=3421286
167
Grofman B. Information, participation, and choice: an economic theory of democracy in perspective. Ann Arbor: : University of Michigan Press 1993.
168
Lewin L, Lavery D. Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics. Oxford University Press 1991. doi:10.1093/0198277253.001.0001
169
McLean I. Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: : Basil Blackwell 1987.
170
Mueller DC, Mueller DC. Public choice II: a revised edition of Public choice. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 1989.
171
Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. London: : Sage 1997. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393
172
Downs A. An economic theory of democracy. New York: : Harper and Row 1957.
173
Downs A. An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. Journal of Political Economy 1957;65:135–50.https://www.jstor.org/stable/1827369
174
Hindmoor A. Reading Downs: New Labour and. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2005;7:402–17. doi:10.1111/j.1467-856X.2005.00186.x
175
Heffernan R. New Labour and Thatcherism: political change in Britain. Basingstoke: : Palgrave 2001. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=736615
176
Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice. Second edition. London: : Palgrave Macmillan 2015.
177
Parsons SD. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. London: : Continuum 2005. https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction
178
WICKHAM-JONES M. Signaling Credibility: Electoral Strategy and New Labour in Britain. Political Science Quarterly 2005;120:653–73. doi:10.1002/j.1538-165X.2005.tb00561.x
179
Hindmoor A. New Labour at the Centre. Oxford University Press 2004. doi:10.1093/0199273146.001.0001
180
Barry B. Sociologists, economists and democracy. London: : Collier-Macmillan 1970.
181
Downs A. An economic theory of democracy. New York: : Harper and Row 1957.
182
Dunleavy P. Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice: economic explanations in political science. London: : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2013. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315835228
183
Patrick Dunleavy and Hugh Ward. Exogenous Voter Preferences and Parties with State Power: Some Internal Problems of Economic Theories of Party Competition. British Journal of Political Science 1981;11:351–80.https://www.jstor.org/stable/193494
184
Dunleavy P, Husbands CT. British democracy at the crossroads: voting and party competition in the 1980s. London: : Allen & Unwin 1985.
185
Green DP, Shapiro I. Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science. New Haven: : Yale University Press 1994. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=3421286
186
Grofman B. Information, participation, and choice: an economic theory of democracy in perspective. Ann Arbor: : University of Michigan Press 1993.
187
McLean I. Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: : Basil Blackwell 1987.
188
Reisman D. Theories of collective action: Downs, Olson and Hirsch. Basingstoke: : Macmillan 1990.
189
Tullock G, Perlman M, Institute of Economic Affairs. The vote motive: an essay in the economics of politics, with applications to the British economy. [London]: : Institute of Economic Affairs 1976.
190
Brittan S. The economic consequences of democracy. London: : Temple Smith 1977.
191
Samuel Brittan. The Economic Contradictions of Democracy. British Journal of Political Science 1975;5:129–59.https://www.jstor.org/stable/193396
192
Brittan S. Economic Contradictions of Democracy Revisited. The Political Quarterly 1989;60:190–203. doi:10.1111/j.1467-923X.1989.tb00765.x
193
Butler D, Kavanagh D. The British general election of 1983. London: : Macmillan 1984.
194
Butler D, Kavanagh D. The British general election of 1987. Basingstoke: : Macmillan 1988.
195
Butler D, Kavanagh D. The British general election of 1992. Basingstoke: : The Macmillan Press Ltd 1992. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=1039809
196
Butler D, Kavanagh D. The British general election of 1997. Basingstoke: : Macmillan 1997.
197
Kavanagh D. The Politics of the Labour Party. London: : Allen and Unwin 1982.
198
King AS. Britain at the polls 1992. Chatham House, N.J.: : Chatham House 1993.
199
King AS, Labour Party. New Labour triumphs: Britain at the polls. Chatham, N.J: : Chatham House 1998.
200
Penniman HR. Britain at the polls, 1979: a study of the General Election. Washington: : American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1981.
201
Gould P, Gould P, Blair T. The unfinished revolution: how New Labour changed British politics forever. London: : Abacus 2011.
202
Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. London: : Sage 1997. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393
203
Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice. Second edition. London: : Palgrave Macmillan 2015.
204
Parsons SD. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. London: : Continuum 2005. https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction
205
Buchanan JM, Wagner RE, Burton J. The consequences of Mr Keynes: an analysis of the misuse of economic theory for political profiteering, with proposals for constitutional disciplines. London: : Institute of Economic Affairs 1978.
206
Buchanan JM, Tollison RD. The Theory of public choice--II. [Rev ed.]. Ann Arbor: : University of Michigan Press 1984.
207
Dunleavy P. Bureaucrats, Budgets and the Growth of the State: Reconstructing an Instrumental Model. British Journal of Political Science 1985;15. doi:10.1017/S000712340000421X
208
Wickham-Jones M. Decision Rules. In: Clarke PAB, Foweraker J, eds. Encyclopedia of democratic thought. London: : Routledge 2001. 136–9.
209
Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy 1977;85:473–92.https://www.jstor.org/stable/1830193
210
MacLean N. Democracy in chains: the deep history of the radical right’s stealth plan for America. Melbourne: : Scribe 2017.
211
Does ‘Democracy in Chains’ paint an accurate picture of James Buchanan? [with updates] - The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/28/does-democracy-in-chains-paint-an-accurate-picture-of-james-buchanan/?utm_term=.17f32c01bf3a
212
Geddes B. Politician’s dilemma: building state capacity in Latin America. Berkeley: : University of California Press 1994.
213
Goodin R. Rational Politicians and Rational Bureaucrats in Washington and Whitehall. Public Administration;60:23–41.http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=4549584&site=ehost-live
214
Kiewiet DR. Macroeconomics & micropolitics: the electoral effects of economic issues. Chicago: : University of Chicago Press 1983.
215
Lewin L, Lavery D. Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics. Oxford University Press 1991. doi:10.1093/0198277253.001.0001
216
McLean I. Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: : Basil Blackwell 1987.
217
Mitchell WC, Green DG, Institute of Economic Affairs. Government as it is: the impact of public choice economics on the judgement of collective decision-making by government and on the teaching of political science. London: : Institute of Economic Affairs 1988.
218
Monroe KR. The Economic approach to politics: a critical reassessment of the theory of rational action. New York: : HarperCollins Publishers 1991.
219
Sayer S. An introduction to macroeconomic policy. London: : Butterworth Scientific 1982.
220
Schott K. Policy, power and order: the persistence of economic problems in capitalist states. London: : Yale University Press 1984.
221
Tullock G, Perlman M, Institute of Economic Affairs. The vote motive: an essay in the economics of politics, with applications to the British economy. [London]: : Institute of Economic Affairs 1976.
222
Dowding KM. The civil service. London: : Routledge 1995.
223
Dunleavy P. Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice: economic explanations in political science. London: : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2013. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315835228
224
Dunleavy P. Explaining the Privatisation Boom: Public Choice versus Radical Approaches. Public Administration;64:13–34.http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=4552330&site=ehost-live
225
McLean I. Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: : Basil Blackwell 1987.
226
Niskanen WA. Bureaucracy & representative government. New Brunswick, N.J.: : Aldine Transaction 2007.
227
Niskanen WA. Bureaucracy: servant or master?: lessons from America. London: : Institute of Economic Affairs 1973.
228
Niskanen N. Competition Among Government Bureaus. In: The economics of politics. London: : Institute of Economic Affairs 1978.
229
Peacock A. The Economics of Bureaucracy: An Inside View. In: The economics of politics. London: : Institute of Economic Affairs 1978.
230
Keith Blackburn and Michael Christensen. Monetary Policy and Policy Credibility: Theories and Evidence. Journal of Economic Literature 1989;27:1–45.https://www.jstor.org/stable/2726940
