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Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice [Internet]. London: Sage; 1997. Available from: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393
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Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice [Internet]. Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan; 2015. Available from: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=6234556
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Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice [Internet]. London: Sage; 1997. Available from: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393
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Parsons SD. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction [Internet]. Vol. Critical political studies. London: Continuum; 2005. Available from: https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction
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Green DP, Shapiro I. Pathologies of rational choice theory : a critique of applications in political science [Internet]. New Haven ; London: Yale University Press; Available from: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=3421286
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Olson M. The rise and decline of nations : economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. New Haven ; London: Yale University Press;
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