

POLI21203: Rational Choice and Politics

[View Online](#)

1.

Welcome – Blackboard Learn [Internet]. Available from:

https://www.ole.bris.ac.uk/webapps/portal/execute/tabs/tabAction?tab_tab_group_id=_17_1

2.

POLI21203 Unit Summary [Internet]. Available from:

<https://www.bris.ac.uk/unit-programme-catalogue/UnitDetails.jsa?ayrCode=19/20&unitCode=POLI21203>

3.

Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice [Internet]. London: Sage; 1997. Available from:

<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393>

4.

Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice [Internet]. Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan; 2015. Available from:

<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=6234556>

5.

Parsons S. Rational Choice and Politics : A Critical Introduction [Internet]. Available from:

<https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction/>

6.

McLean I. Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1987.

7.

Chong D. Collective action and the civil rights movement [Internet]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1991. Available from:
<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=1977975>

8.

Poundstone W. Prisoner's dilemma. New York: Anchor Books; 1993.

9.

Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice [Internet]. London: Sage; 1997. Available from:
<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393>

10.

Parsons SD. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction [Internet]. London: Continuum; 2005. Available from:
<https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction>

11.

Monroe K. The Theory of Rational Action: Its Origins and Usefulness for Political Science. The Economic approach to politics: a critical reassessment of the theory of rational action. New York: HarperCollins Publishers; 1991. p. 1–32.

12.

Tsebelis G. Nested games: rational choice in comparative politics [Internet]. Berkeley: University of California Press; 1990. Available from:
<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=224383>

13.

Irrational exuberance : when did political science forget about politics? | New Republic [Internet]. Available from: <https://newrepublic.com/article/78956/political-science-irrational-exuberance>

14.

Becker G. The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour. Rational choice. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1986. p. 108–122.

15.

Green D, Shapiro I. Methodological Pathologies. Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science [Internet]. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1994. p. 33–46. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=3421286>

16.

Hindmoor, Andrew. 'Major Combat Operations Have Ended'? Arguing about Rational Choice. British Journal of Political Science [Internet]. Cambridge University Press; 2011;41(1):191–210. Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41241646>

17.

MacLean N. Democracy in chains: the deep history of the radical right's stealth plan for America. Melbourne: Scribe; 2017.

18.

Adler JH. Does 'Democracy in Chains' paint an accurate picture of James Buchanan? [with updates] - The Washington Post [Internet]. Available from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/28/does-democracy-in-chains-paint-an-accurate-picture-of-james-buchanan/?utm_term=.219bdf80030f

19.

Buchanan J. An Individualist Theory of the Policy Process. Varieties of political theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall; 1966.

20.

Buchanan J. From Private Preferences to Public Philosophy: The Development of Public Choice. The economics of politics. London: Institute of Economic Affairs; 1978.

21.

Dunleavy P. Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice: economic explanations in political science [Internet]. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group; 2013. Available from: <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315835228>

22.

Elster J. Introduction. In: Elster J, editor. Rational choice. Washington Square, New York: New York University Press; 1986.

23.

Elster J. Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences [Internet]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1989. Available from: <http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9780511812255>

24.

Green DP, Shapiro I. Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science [Internet]. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1994. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=3421286>

25.

Hauptmann E. Putting choice before democracy: a critique of rational choice theory. Albany: State University of New York Press; 1996.

26.

Lane JE. The Epistemological Foundations of Public Choice Theory. Scandinavian Political Studies. 1990;13(1):65–82.

27.

Lewin L, Lavery D. Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics [Internet]. Oxford University Press; 1991. Available from: <http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198277253.001.0001/acprof-9780198277255>

28.

McLean I. Public choice : an introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell;

29.

Monroe KR. The heart of altruism: perceptions of a common humanity. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 1996.

30.

Shepsle KA, Bonchek MS. Analyzing politics: rationality, behavior and institutions. New York: W.W. Norton; 1997.

31.

Tullock G, Perlman M, Institute of Economic Affairs. The vote motive: an essay in the economics of politics, with applications to the British economy. [London]: Institute of Economic Affairs; 1976.

32.

Udehn L. The limits of public choice: a sociological critique of the economic theory of politics. London: Routledge; 1996.

33.

Gambetta D. The Sicilian mafia : the business of private protection. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press;

34.

Greenway J. Deciding factors in British politics : a case-studies approach. London: Routledge;

35.

Hargreaves S. The Theory of choice : a critical guide. Oxford: Blackwell;

36.

Tsebelis G. Nested Games [Internet]. University Of California Press; 1991. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=224383>

37.

Sen A. Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory. Scientific models and man. Oxford: Clarendon Press;

38.

Barry NP. The new right. London: Croom Helm;

39.

Bosanquet N. After the New Right. Aldershot: Dartmouth;

40.

Dunleavy P, O'Leary B. Theories of the state: the politics of liberal democracy. Basingstoke: Macmillan Education; 1987.

41.

Green DG. The new right : the counter-revolution in political, economic and social thought. Brighton: Wheatsheaf;

42.

King DS. The new right : politics, markets and citizenship. Basingstoke: Macmillan Education;

43.

Elster J. Sour Grapes [Internet]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2016. Available from: <http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9781316494172>

44.

Elster J. Ulysses and the sirens : studies in rationality and irrationality. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press ; Paris: Cambridge University Press ; Paris : Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme;

45.

Democracy in Chains: An interview with author Nancy MacLean | Southern Poverty Law Center [Internet]. Available from: <https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/03/08/democracy-chains-interview-author-nancy-maclean>

46.

Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice [Internet]. London: Sage; 1997. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393>

47.

Olson M. Collective Action. In: Milgate M, Newman P, editors. The invisible hand. London: Macmillan Reference; 1989. p. 61-69.

48.

Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice. Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan; 2015.

49.

Parsons SD. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction [Internet]. London: Continuum; 2005. Available from: <https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction>

50.

Olson M. The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups [Internet]. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; 1971. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=4642422>

51.

McLean I. Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1987.

52.

McLean, Iain. Review article: The divided legacy of Mancur Olson. British Journal of Political Science [Internet]. Cambridge University Press; 2000;30(4):651–668. Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/194289>

53.

Dunleavy P. Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice: economic explanations in political science [Internet]. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group; 2013. Available from: <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315835228>

54.

Barry B. Sociologists, economists and democracy. London: Collier-Macmillan;

55.

Baumgartner FR, Leech BL. Basic interests: the importance of groups in politics and in political science [Internet]. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1998. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483510>

56.

Boyer MA. International cooperation and public goods : opportunities for the Western Alliance. Baltimore ; London: Johns Hopkins University Press;

57.

Chong D. Collective action and the civil rights movement [Internet]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Available from:
<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=1977975>

58.

Dunleavy P. Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice : economic explanations in political science [Internet]. London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group; Available from:
<https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315835228>

59.

Green DP, Shapiro I. Pathologies of rational choice theory : a critique of applications in political science [Internet]. New Haven ; London: Yale University Press; Available from:
<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=3421286>

60.

Hansen JM. The Political Economy of Group Membership. American Political Science Review. 1985;79(01):79-96.

61.

Hardin R. Collective action. Baltimore ; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, for Resources for the Future;

62.

Jordan G, Maloney W. The protest business ? : mobilizing campaign groups. Manchester: Manchester University Press;

63.

Laver M. Invitation to politics. Oxford: Robertson;

64.

McLean I. Public choice : an introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell;

65.

Moe TM. The organization of interests : incentives and the internal dynamics of the political interest groups. Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press;

66.

Mueller DC. Public choice II : a revised edition of Public choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;

67.

Olson M. The logic of collective action [Internet]. Harvard University Press; 2009. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=4642422>

68.

Olson M. The rise and decline of nations : economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. New Haven ; London: Yale University Press;

69.

Reisman David. Theories of collective action. Basingstoke: Macmillan;

70.

Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley. Labour's grass roots : the politics of party membership. Oxford: Clarendon Press;

71.

Kenneth A. Analyzing politics : rationality, behavior and institutions. New York ; London: W.W. Norton;

72.

Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice [Internet]. London: Sage; 1997. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393>

73.

Prisoners Dilemma. Game theory. Basingstoke: Macmillan; 1989. p. 199–204.

74.

Dodge RV. The Prisoner's Dilemma. Schelling's game theory: how to make decisions [Internet]. New York: Oxford University Press; 2012. p. 137–146. Available from: <https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199857203.001.0001/acprof-9780199857203>

75.

Binmore KG. Getting Locked In. Playing for real: a text on game theory [Internet]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2007. Available from: <http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.001.0001/acprof-9780195300574-chapter-1>

76.

Schotter A. Free market economics: a critical appraisal. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1990.

77.

Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice. Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan; 2015.

78.

Parsons SD. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction [Internet]. London: Continuum; 2005. Available from: <https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction>

79.

Poundstone W. Prisoner's dilemma. New York: Anchor Books; 1993.

80.

Peterson M. The Prisoner's Dilemma [Internet]. Peterson M, editor. Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2015. Available from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107360174>

81.

Boston J. Corporatist Incomes Policies, the Free Rider Problem and the British Labour Government's Social Contract. Organized interests and the state : studies in meso-corporatism. London: Sage;

82.

Brennan G, Tullock G. An economic theory of military tactics. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 1982;3(2-3):225-242.

83.

Cohen Y. Radicals, reformers, and reactionaries : the prisoner's dilemma and the collapse of democracy in Latin America. Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press;

84.

Elster J. Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences [Internet]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1989. Available from: <https://bris.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812255>

85.

Lange P. Unions, Workers and Wage Regulation: the Rational Bases of Consent. In: Goldthorpe JH, editor. Order and conflict in contemporary capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1984.

86.

Lichbach MI. The rebel's dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; 1995.

87.

McLean I. Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1987.

88.

Monroe KR. The Economic approach to politics: a critical reassessment of the theory of rational action. New York: HarperCollins Publishers; 1991.

89.

Poundstone W. Prisoner's dilemma. New York: Anchor Books; 1993.

90.

Schotter A. Free market economics: a critical appraisal. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1990.

91.

Tsebelis G. Nested games: rational choice in comparative politics [Internet]. Berkeley: University of California Press; 1990. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=224383>

92.

Colomer JM. Game theory and the transition to democracy: the Spanish model. Aldershot: Edward Elgar; 1995.

93.

Morrow JD. Game theory for political scientists. Princeton, N.J.: Princetown University Press; 1994.

94.

Heap SH, Varoufakis Y. Game theory: a critical text. 2nd ed. London: Routledge; 2004.

95.

Selective Social Incentives and Reputational Concerns. Collective action and the civil rights movement [Internet]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1991. p. 31–72. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/reader.action?docID=1977975&ppg=46>

96.

Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice [Internet]. London: Sage; 1997. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393>

97.

Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice. Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan; 2015.

98.

Axelrod R. The Evolution of Cooperation. The evolution of cooperation. London: Penguin Books; 1990. p. 3–24.

99.

McLean I. How People (And Animals) Cooperate. Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1987. p. 125–148.

100.

Poundstone W. Prisoner's dilemma. New York: Anchor Books; 1993.

101.

Northcott R, Alexandrova A. Prisoner's Dilemma doesn't explain much. In: Peterson M, editor. The prisoner's dilemma [Internet]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2015. p. 64–83. Available from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107360174>

102.

Axelrod R. The evolution of cooperation. Revised edition. New York: Basic Books; 2006.

103.

Boyer MA. International cooperation and public goods: opportunities for the Western Alliance. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; 1993.

104.

Green DP, Shapiro I. Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science [Internet]. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1994. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=3421286>

105.

Hampton J. The Contractarian Explanation of the State. Politics and rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1993.

106.

Heap SH. The Theory of choice: a critical guide. Oxford: Blackwell; 1992.

107.

Keohane RO. After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy [Internet]. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1984. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=5543821>

108.

Cook KS, Levi M. The Limits of Rationality. Chicago: Chicago University Press; 1990.

109.

Lichbach MI. The rebel's dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; 1995.

110.

Lichbach MI. The cooperator's dilemma. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press; 1996.

111.

McLean I. Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1987.

112.

Morrow JD. Game theory for political scientists. Princeton, N.J.: Princetown University Press; 1994.

113.

Ostrom E. Governing the Commons [Internet]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2015. Available from: <http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9781316423936>

114.

Oye KA. Cooperation under anarchy. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1986.

115.

Poundstone W. Prisoner's dilemma. New York: Anchor Books; 1993.

116.

Stein AA. Why nations cooperate: circumstance and choice in international relations. New York: Cornell University Press; 1990.

117.

Taylor M, Taylor M. The possibility of cooperation. [Rev. ed]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1987.

118.

Taylor M. Community, Anarchy and Liberty [Internet]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1982. Available from: <https://bris.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511607875>

119.

Taylor M. Three on Collective Action. Comparative Political Studies. 1991;24(3):391–396.

120.

Udehn L. The limits of public choice: a sociological critique of the economic theory of politics. London: Routledge; 1996.

121.

Garrett Hardin. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science [Internet]. American Association for the Advancement of Science; 1968;162(3859):1243–1248. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1724745>

122.

Carling AH. Chicken, Gender, Class. Social division. London: Verso; 1991. p. 253–271.

123.

Alan Carling. Liberty, Equality, Community. New Left Review [Internet]. 1988;171. Available from: <https://newleftreview.org/I/171/alan-carling-liberty-equality-community>

124.

Chong D. Collective action and the civil rights movement [Internet]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1991. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=1977975>

125.

Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice. Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan; 2015.

126.

Poundstone W. Prisoner's Dilemma. Prisoner's dilemma. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1993. p. 195–213.

127.

Wickham-Jones M. Rationality, Revolution, and Reassurance. Preferences, institutions, and rational choice. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1995. p. 249–265.

128.

Parsons SD. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction [Internet]. London: Continuum; 2005. Available from: <https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction>

129.

Schelling TC. Thermostats, Lemons and other Families of Models. Micromotives and macrobehavior. New York: Norton; 1978. p. 81–133.

130.

Taylor M, Taylor M. The possibility of cooperation. [Rev. ed]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1987.

131.

Taylor M, Ward H. Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision. *Political Studies*. 1982;30(3):350–370.

132.

Hirschman AO. Exit and Voice. *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics* [Internet]. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK; 2017. p. 1–10. Available from: http://link.springer.com/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_621-2

133.

Hirschman AO. Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History. *World Politics* [Internet]. 1993;45(02):173–202. Available from: <https://www.jstor-org.bris.idm.oclc.org/stable/2950657>

134.

A. H. Birch. Economic Models in Political Science: The Case of 'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty'. *British Journal of Political Science* [Internet]. Cambridge University PressCambridge University Press; 1975;5(1):69–82. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/193274>

135.

Dowding K, John P, Mergoupis T, Vugt M. Exit, voice and loyalty: Analytic and empirical developments. *European Journal of Political Research* [Internet]. 2000;37(4):469–495. Available from: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-6765.00522/pdf>

136.

Chong D. Collective action and the civil rights movement [Internet]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1991. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=1977975>

137.

Hirschman AO. Shifting involvements: private interest and public action. Oxford: Martin Robertson; 1982.

138.

Adelman J. Worldly philosopher: the odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman [Internet]. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 2013. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=1108130>

139.

Taylor M. Rationality and revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1987.

140.

Barry B. Review article - Exit, Voice and Loyalty. British Journal of Political Science [Internet]. Cambridge University Press; 1974;4(1):79-107. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/193628>

141.

Foxley A, McPherson MS, O'Donnell G, Hirschman AO, Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies. Development, democracy and the art of trespassing: essays in honor of Albert O. Hirschman. Notre Dame: Published for the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies by University of Notre Dame Press; 1986.

142.

Freeman RB, Medoff JL. What do unions do? New York: Basic Books; 1984.

143.

Hirschman AO. Exit, voice, and loyalty: responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press; 1970.

144.

Hirschman AO. *Essays in trespassing: economics to politics and beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1981.

145.

Hirschman AO. Exit and Voice. *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics* [Internet]. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK; 2017. p. 1–10. Available from: http://link.springer.com/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_621-2

146.

Michael Laver. 'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty' Revisited: The Strategic Production and Consumption of Public and Private Goods. *British Journal of Political Science* [Internet]. Cambridge University Press; 1976;6(4):463–482. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/193283>

147.

Allen Buchanan. Revolutionary Motivation and Rationality. *Philosophy & Public Affairs* [Internet]. Wiley; 1979;9(1):59–82. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2264867>

148.

Hirschman AO. *Shifting involvements: private interest and public action*. Oxford: Martin Robertson; 1982.

149.

Lichbach MI. *The rebel's dilemma*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; 1995.

150.

Parsons SD. *Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction* [Internet]. London: Continuum; 2005. Available from: <https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction/>

151.

Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice [Internet]. London: Sage; 1997. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393>

152.

Dowding K. Is it Rational to Vote? Five Types of Answer and a Suggestion. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. 2005;7(3):442–459.

153.

Blais A. To vote or not to vote?: the merits and limits of rational choice theory. Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press; 2000.

154.

Brennan G, Lomasky L. The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington: Toward a Smithian Theory of Electoral Behavior. *Economics and Philosophy*. 1985;1(02).

155.

Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice. Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan; 2015.

156.

Parsons S. The Rationality of Voting: A Response to Dowding. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. 2006;8(2):295–298.

157.

Parsons SD. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction [Internet]. London: Continuum; 2005. Available from: <https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction>

158.

Dowding K. The 'D-Term': A Reply to Stephen Parsons. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. 2006 May;8(2):299–302.

159.

Barry B. *Sociologists, economists and democracy*. London: Collier-Macmillan; 1970.

160.

Brennan G, Lomasky L. *The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington: Toward a Smithian Theory of Electoral Behavior*. *Economics and Philosophy*. 1985;1(02).

161.

Brennan G, Lomasky L, editors. *Democracy and decision* [Internet]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1993. Available from: <http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9781139173544>

162.

Keith M Dowding. *Preferences, institutions, and rational choice* / edited by Keith Dowding and Desmond King. Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York: Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press;

163.

Anthony. Downs. *An economic theory of democracy* / [by] Anthony Downs. New York: Harper and Row;

164.

Dunleav P. *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice* [Internet]. Routledge Ltd; 2014. Available from: <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315835228>

165.

Goodin RE, Roberts KWS. The Ethical Voter. *American Political Science Review*. 1975;69(03):926–928.

166.

Green DP, Shapiro I. *Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science* [Internet]. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1994. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=3421286>

167.

Grofman B. *Information, participation, and choice: an economic theory of democracy in perspective*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; 1993.

168.

Lewin L, Lavery D. *Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics* [Internet]. Oxford University Press; 1991. Available from: <http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198277253.001.0001/acprof-9780198277255>

169.

McLean I. *Public choice: an introduction*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1987.

170.

Mueller DC, Mueller DC. *Public choice II: a revised edition of Public choice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1989.

171.

Laver M. *Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice* [Internet]. London: Sage; 1997. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393>

172.

Downs A. An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and Row; 1957.

173.

Downs A. An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. Journal of Political Economy [Internet]. 1957;65(2):135–150. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1827369>

174.

Hindmoor A. Reading Downs: New Labour and. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 2005;7(3):402–417.

175.

Heffernan R. New Labour and Thatcherism: political change in Britain [Internet]. Basingstoke: Palgrave; 2001. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=736615>

176.

Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice. Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan; 2015.

177.

Parsons SD. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction [Internet]. London: Continuum; 2005. Available from: <https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction>

178.

WICKHAM-JONES M. Signaling Credibility: Electoral Strategy and New Labour in Britain. Political Science Quarterly. 2005 Dec;120(4):653–673.

179.

Hindmoor A. New Labour at the Centre [Internet]. Oxford University Press; 2004. Available from: <http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199273146.001.0001/acprof-9780199273140>

180.

Barry B. Sociologists, economists and democracy. London: Collier-Macmillan; 1970.

181.

Downs A. An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and Row; 1957.

182.

Dunleavy P. Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice: economic explanations in political science [Internet]. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group; 2013. Available from: <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315835228>

183.

Patrick Dunleavy and Hugh Ward. Exogenous Voter Preferences and Parties with State Power: Some Internal Problems of Economic Theories of Party Competition. British Journal of Political Science [Internet]. Cambridge University Press; 1981;11(3):351–380. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/193494>

184.

Dunleavy P, Husbands CT. British democracy at the crossroads: voting and party competition in the 1980s. London: Allen & Unwin; 1985.

185.

Green DP, Shapiro I. Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science [Internet]. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1994. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=3421286>

186.

Grofman B. Information, participation, and choice: an economic theory of democracy in perspective. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; 1993.

187.

McLean I. Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1987.

188.

Reisman D. Theories of collective action: Downs, Olson and Hirsch. Basingstoke: Macmillan; 1990.

189.

Tullock G, Perlman M, Institute of Economic Affairs. The vote motive: an essay in the economics of politics, with applications to the British economy. [London]: Institute of Economic Affairs; 1976.

190.

Brittan S. The economic consequences of democracy. London: Temple Smith; 1977.

191.

Samuel Brittan. The Economic Contradictions of Democracy. British Journal of Political Science [Internet]. Cambridge University Press; 1975;5(2):129-159. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/193396>

192.

Brittan S. Economic Contradictions of Democracy Revisited. The Political Quarterly. 1989;60(2):190-203.

193.

Butler D, Kavanagh D. The British general election of 1983. London: Macmillan; 1984.

194.

Butler D, Kavanagh D. The British general election of 1987. Basingstoke: Macmillan; 1988.

195.

Butler D, Kavanagh D. The British general election of 1992 [Internet]. Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd; 1992. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=1039809>

196.

Butler D, Kavanagh D. The British general election of 1997. Basingstoke: Macmillan; 1997.

197.

Kavanagh D. The Politics of the Labour Party. London: Allen and Unwin; 1982.

198.

King AS. Britain at the polls 1992. Chatham House, N.J.: Chatham House; 1993.

199.

King AS, Labour Party. New Labour triumphs: Britain at the polls. Chatham, N.J: Chatham House; 1998.

200.

Penniman HR. Britain at the polls, 1979: a study of the General Election. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; 1981.

201.

Gould P, Gould P, Blair T. The unfinished revolution: how New Labour changed British politics forever. London: Abacus; 2011.

202.

Laver M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice [Internet]. London: Sage; 1997. Available from: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393>

203.

Hindmoor A, Taylor B. Rational choice. Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan; 2015.

204.

Parsons SD. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction [Internet]. London: Continuum; 2005. Available from: <https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction>

205.

Buchanan JM, Wagner RE, Burton J. The consequences of Mr Keynes: an analysis of the misuse of economic theory for political profiteering, with proposals for constitutional disciplines. London: Institute of Economic Affairs; 1978.

206.

Buchanan JM, Tollison RD. The Theory of public choice--II. [Rev ed.]. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; 1984.

207.

Dunleavy P. Bureaucrats, Budgets and the Growth of the State: Reconstructing an Instrumental Model. British Journal of Political Science. 1985;15(03).

208.

Wickham-Jones M. Decision Rules. In: Clarke PAB, Foweraker J, editors. Encyclopedia of democratic thought. London: Routledge; 2001. p. 136-139.

209.

Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. *Journal of Political Economy* [Internet]. The University of Chicago Press; 1977;85(3):473–492. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1830193>

210.

MacLean N. *Democracy in chains: the deep history of the radical right's stealth plan for America*. Melbourne: Scribe; 2017.

211.

Does 'Democracy in Chains' paint an accurate picture of James Buchanan? [with updates] - The Washington Post [Internet]. Available from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/28/does-democracy-in-chains-paint-an-accurate-picture-of-james-buchanan/?utm_term=.17f32c01bf3a

212.

Geddes B. *Politician's dilemma: building state capacity in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press; 1994.

213.

Goodin R. Rational Politicians and Rational Bureaucrats in Washington and Whitehall. *Public Administration* [Internet]. 60(1):23–41. Available from: <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=4549584&site=ehost-live>

214.

Kiewiet DR. *Macroeconomics & micropolitics: the electoral effects of economic issues*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1983.

215.

Lewin L, Lavery D. *Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics* [Internet]. Oxford

University Press; 1991. Available from:
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198277253.001.0001/acprof-9780198277255>

216.

McLean I. Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1987.

217.

Mitchell WC, Green DG, Institute of Economic Affairs. Government as it is: the impact of public choice economics on the judgement of collective decision-making by government and on the teaching of political science. London: Institute of Economic Affairs; 1988.

218.

Monroe KR. The Economic approach to politics: a critical reassessment of the theory of rational action. New York: HarperCollins Publishers; 1991.

219.

Sayer S. An introduction to macroeconomic policy. London: Butterworth Scientific; 1982.

220.

Schott K. Policy, power and order: the persistence of economic problems in capitalist states. London: Yale University Press; 1984.

221.

Tullock G, Perlman M, Institute of Economic Affairs. The vote motive: an essay in the economics of politics, with applications to the British economy. [London]: Institute of Economic Affairs; 1976.

222.

Dowding KM. The civil service. London: Routledge; 1995.

223.

Dunleavy P. Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice: economic explanations in political science [Internet]. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group; 2013. Available from: <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315835228>

224.

Dunleavy P. Explaining the Privatisation Boom: Public Choice versus Radical Approaches. Public Administration [Internet]. 64(1):13–34. Available from: <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=4552330&p;site=ehost-live>

225.

McLean I. Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1987.

226.

Niskanen WA. Bureaucracy & representative government. New Brunswick, N.J.: Aldine Transaction; 2007.

227.

Niskanen WA. Bureaucracy: servant or master?: lessons from America. London: Institute of Economic Affairs; 1973.

228.

Niskanen N. Competition Among Government Bureaus. The economics of politics. London: Institute of Economic Affairs; 1978.

229.

Peacock A. The Economics of Bureaucracy: An Inside View. The economics of politics. London: Institute of Economic Affairs; 1978.

230.

Keith Blackburn and Michael Christensen. Monetary Policy and Policy Credibility: Theories and Evidence. *Journal of Economic Literature* [Internet]. American Economic Association; 1989;27(1):1–45. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2726940>