A. H. Birch. 1975. ‘Economic Models in Political Science: The Case of “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty”’. British Journal of Political Science 5(1):69–82.
Adelman, Jeremy. 2013. Worldly Philosopher: The Odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Adler, Jonathan H. n.d. ‘Does “Democracy in Chains” Paint an Accurate Picture of James Buchanan? [With Updates] - The Washington Post’. Retrieved (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/28/does-democracy-in-chains-paint-an-accurate-picture-of-james-buchanan/?utm_term=.219bdf80030f).
Alan Carling. 1988. ‘Liberty, Equality, Community’. New Left Review 171.
Anon. 1989. ‘Prisoners Dilemma’. Pp. 199–204 in Game theory. Vol. The new Palgrave. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Anon. 1991. ‘Selective Social Incentives and Reputational Concerns’. Pp. 31–72 in Collective action and the civil rights movement. Vol. American politics and political economy series. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Anon. 1992. ‘Rival Views of Market Society’. Pp. 77–101 in Rival views of market society, and other recent essays. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Anon. n.d.-a. ‘Irrational Exuberance : When Did Political Science Forget about Politics? | New Republic’. Retrieved (https://newrepublic.com/article/78956/political-science-irrational-exuberance).
Anon. n.d.-b. ‘“Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans”, Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 83, No. 3, 1977, Pp. 473-91’. Retrieved (https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/research/prescott/papers/rulesdiscretion.pdf?la=en).
Axelrod, Robert. 1990. ‘The Evolution of Cooperation’. Pp. 3–24 in The evolution of cooperation. London: Penguin Books.
Becker, Gary. 1986. ‘The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour’. Pp. 108–22 in Rational choice. Vol. Readings in social and political theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Binmore, K. G. 2007. ‘Getting Locked In’. in Playing for real: a text on game theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blais, André. 2000. To Vote or Not to Vote?: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory. Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Brennan, Geoffrey, and Loren Lomasky. 1985. ‘The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington: Toward a Smithian Theory of Electoral Behavior’. Economics and Philosophy 1(02). doi: 10.1017/S0266267100002467.
Buchanan, James M., and Robert D. Tollison. 1984. The Theory of Public Choice--II. [Rev ed.]. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Buchanan, James M., Richard E. Wagner, and John Burton. 1978. The Consequences of Mr Keynes: An Analysis of the Misuse of Economic Theory for Political Profiteering, with Proposals for Constitutional Disciplines. Vol. Hobart paper; 78. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
Carling, Alan H. 1991. ‘Chicken, Gender, Class’. Pp. 253–71 in Social division. London: Verso.
Chong, Dennis. 1991a. Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. Vol. American politics and political economy series. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Chong, Dennis. 1991b. Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. Vol. American politics and political economy series. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Dodge, Robert V. 2012. ‘The Prisoner’s Dilemma’. Pp. 137–46 in Schelling’s game theory: how to make decisions. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dowding, Keith. 2005. ‘Is It Rational to Vote? Five Types of Answer and a Suggestion’. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 7(3):442–59. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2005.00188.x.
Dowding, Keith, Peter John, Thanos Mergoupis, and Mark Vugt. 2000. ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Analytic and Empirical Developments’. European Journal of Political Research 37(4):469–95.
Downs, Anthony. 1957a. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
Downs, Anthony. 1957b. ‘An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy’. Journal of Political Economy 65(2):135–50.
Dunleavy, Patrick. 1985. ‘Bureaucrats, Budgets and the Growth of the State: Reconstructing an Instrumental Model’. British Journal of Political Science 15(03). doi: 10.1017/S000712340000421X.
Dunleavy, Patrick. 2013. Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
Green, Donald, and Ian Shapiro. 1994. ‘Methodological Pathologies’. Pp. 33–46 in Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Heffernan, Richard. 2001. New Labour and Thatcherism: Political Change in Britain. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Hindmoor, Andrew. 2005. ‘Reading Downs: New Labour And’. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 7(3):402–17. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2005.00186.x.
Hindmoor, Andrew. 2011. ‘“Major Combat Operations Have Ended”? Arguing about Rational Choice’. British Journal of Political Science 41(1):191–210.
Hindmoor, Andrew, and Brad Taylor. 2015a. Rational Choice. Vol. Political analysis. Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hindmoor, Andrew, and Brad Taylor. 2015b. Rational Choice. Vol. Political analysis. Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hindmoor, Andrew, and Brad Taylor. 2015c. Rational Choice. Vol. Political analysis. Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hindmoor, Andrew, and Brad Taylor. 2015d. Rational Choice. Vol. Political analysis. Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hindmoor, Andrew, and Brad Taylor. 2015e. Rational Choice. Vol. Political analysis. Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hindmoor, Andrew, and Brad Taylor. 2015f. Rational Choice. Vol. Political analysis. Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hindmoor, Andrew, and Brad Taylor. 2015g. Rational Choice. Vol. Political analysis. Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hirschman, Albert O. 1982. Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
Hirschman, Albert O. 1995. ‘Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic’. Pp. 9–44 in A propensity to self-subversion. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Laver, Michael. 1997a. Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice. London: Sage.
Laver, Michael. 1997b. Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice. London: Sage.
Laver, Michael. 1997c. Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice. London: Sage.
Laver, Michael. 1997d. Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice. London: Sage.
Laver, Michael. 1997e. Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice. London: Sage.
Laver, Michael. 1997f. Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice. London: Sage.
Laver, Michael. 1997g. Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice. London: Sage.
MacLean, Nancy. 2017a. Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America. Melbourne: Scribe.
MacLean, Nancy. 2017b. Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America. Melbourne: Scribe.
McLean, Iain. 1987a. ‘How People (And Animals) Cooperate’. Pp. 125–48 in Public choice: an introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
McLean, Iain. 1987b. Public Choice: An Introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Mclean, Iain. 2000. ‘Review Article: The Divided Legacy of Mancur Olson’. British Journal of Political Science 30(4):651–68.
Monroe, K. 1991. ‘The Theory of Rational Action: Its Origins and Usefulness for Political Science’. Pp. 1–32 in The Economic approach to politics: a critical reassessment of the theory of rational action. Vol. HarperCollins series in comparative politics. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
Northcott, Robert, and Anna Alexandrova. 2015. ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma Doesn’t Explain Much’. Pp. 64–83 in The prisoner’s dilemma. Vol. Classic philosophical arguments, edited by M. Peterson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Olson, Mancur. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Olson, Mancur. 1989. ‘Collective Action’. Pp. 61–69 in The invisible hand, edited by M. Milgate and P. Newman. London: Macmillan Reference.
Parsons, Stephen. 2006. ‘The Rationality of Voting: A Response to Dowding’. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 8(2):295–98. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856x.2006.00215.x.
Parsons, Stephen D. 2005a. Rational Choice and Politics: A Critical Introduction. Vol. Critical political studies. London: Continuum.
Parsons, Stephen D. 2005b. Rational Choice and Politics: A Critical Introduction. Vol. Critical political studies. London: Continuum.
Parsons, Stephen D. 2005c. Rational Choice and Politics: A Critical Introduction. Vol. Critical political studies. London: Continuum.
Parsons, Stephen D. 2005d. Rational Choice and Politics: A Critical Introduction. Vol. Critical political studies. London: Continuum.
Parsons, Stephen D. 2005e. Rational Choice and Politics: A Critical Introduction. Vol. Critical political studies. London: Continuum.
Parsons, Stephen D. 2005f. Rational Choice and Politics: A Critical Introduction. Vol. Critical political studies. London: Continuum.
Parsons, Stephen D. 2005g. Rational Choice and Politics: A Critical Introduction. Vol. Critical political studies. London: Continuum.
Peterson, Martin. 2015. The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Vol. Classic philosophical arguments. edited by M. Peterson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Poundstone, William. 1993a. Prisoner’s Dilemma. New York: Anchor Books.
Poundstone, William. 1993b. Prisoner’s Dilemma. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Poundstone, William. 1993c. ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’. Pp. 195–213 in Prisoner’s dilemma. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schelling, Thomas C. 1978. ‘Thermostats, Lemons and Other Families of Models’. Pp. 81–133 in Micromotives and macrobehavior. Vol. Fels lectures on public policy analysis. New York: Norton.
Schotter, Andrew. 1990. Free Market Economics: A Critical Appraisal. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Tsebelis, George. 1990. Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Vol. California series on social choice and political economy. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wickham-Jones, Mark. 1995a. ‘“Anticipating Social Democracy, Pre-Empting Anticipations Economic-Policy-Making in the British Labour Party, 1987-1992”’. Politics and Society 23:465–94.
Wickham-Jones, Mark. 1995b. ‘Rationality, Revolution, and Reassurance’. Pp. 249–65 in Preferences, institutions, and rational choice. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
