1.
Laver, M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. (Sage, 1997).
2.
Parsons, S. D. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. vol. Critical political studies (Continuum, 2005).
3.
Monroe, K. The Theory of Rational Action: Its Origins and Usefulness for Political Science. in The Economic approach to politics: a critical reassessment of the theory of rational action vol. HarperCollins series in comparative politics 1–32 (HarperCollins Publishers, 1991).
4.
Tsebelis, G. Nested games: rational choice in comparative politics. vol. California series on social choice and political economy (University of California Press, 1990).
5.
Irrational exuberance : when did political science forget about politics? | New Republic. https://newrepublic.com/article/78956/political-science-irrational-exuberance.
6.
Becker, G. The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour. in Rational choice vol. Readings in social and political theory 108–122 (Basil Blackwell, 1986).
7.
Green, D. & Shapiro, I. Methodological Pathologies. in Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science 33–46 (Yale University Press, 1994).
8.
Hindmoor, Andrew. ‘Major Combat Operations Have Ended’? Arguing about Rational Choice. British Journal of Political Science 41, 191–210 (2011).
9.
MacLean, N. Democracy in chains: the deep history of the radical right’s stealth plan for America. (Scribe, 2017).
10.
Adler, J. H. Does ‘Democracy in Chains’ paint an accurate picture of James Buchanan? [with updates] - The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/28/does-democracy-in-chains-paint-an-accurate-picture-of-james-buchanan/?utm_term=.219bdf80030f.
11.
Laver, M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. (Sage, 1997).
12.
Olson, M. Collective Action. in The invisible hand (eds. Milgate, M. & Newman, P.) 61–69 (Macmillan Reference, 1989).
13.
Hindmoor, A. & Taylor, B. Rational choice. vol. Political analysis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
14.
Parsons, S. D. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. vol. Critical political studies (Continuum, 2005).
15.
Olson, M. The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. (Harvard University Press, 1971).
16.
McLean, I. Public choice: an introduction. (Basil Blackwell, 1987).
17.
Mclean, Iain. Review article: The divided legacy of Mancur Olson. British Journal of Political Science 30, 651–668 (2000).
18.
Dunleavy, P. Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice: economic explanations in political science. (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2013).
19.
Laver, M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. (Sage, 1997).
20.
Prisoners Dilemma. in Game theory vol. The new Palgrave 199–204 (Macmillan, 1989).
21.
Dodge, R. V. The Prisoner’s Dilemma. in Schelling’s game theory: how to make decisions 137–146 (Oxford University Press, 2012). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199857203.003.0012.
22.
Binmore, K. G. Getting Locked In. in Playing for real: a text on game theory (Oxford University Press, 2007). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0001.
23.
Schotter, A. Free market economics: a critical appraisal. (Basil Blackwell, 1990).
24.
Hindmoor, A. & Taylor, B. Rational choice. vol. Political analysis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
25.
Parsons, S. D. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. vol. Critical political studies (Continuum, 2005).
26.
Poundstone, W. Prisoner’s dilemma. (Anchor Books, 1993).
27.
Peterson, M. The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Introduction vol. Classic philosophical arguments (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
28.
Selective Social Incentives and Reputational Concerns. in Collective action and the civil rights movement vol. American politics and political economy series 31–72 (University of Chicago Press, 1991).
29.
Laver, M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. (Sage, 1997).
30.
Hindmoor, A. & Taylor, B. Rational choice. vol. Political analysis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
31.
Axelrod, R. The Evolution of Cooperation. in The evolution of cooperation 3–24 (Penguin Books, 1990).
32.
McLean, I. How People (And Animals) Cooperate. in Public choice: an introduction 125–148 (Basil Blackwell, 1987).
33.
Poundstone, W. Prisoner’s dilemma. (Oxford University Press, 1993).
34.
Northcott, R. & Alexandrova, A. Prisoner’s Dilemma doesn’t explain much. in The prisoner’s dilemma (ed. Peterson, M.) vol. Classic philosophical arguments 64–83 (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
35.
Carling, A. H. Chicken, Gender, Class. in Social division 253–271 (Verso, 1991).
36.
Alan Carling. Liberty, Equality, Community. New Left Review 171, (1988).
37.
Chong, D. Collective action and the civil rights movement. vol. American politics and political economy series (University of Chicago Press, 1991).
38.
Hindmoor, A. & Taylor, B. Rational choice. vol. Political analysis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
39.
Poundstone, W. Prisoner’s Dilemma. in Prisoner’s dilemma 195–213 (Oxford University Press, 1993).
40.
Wickham-Jones, M. Rationality, Revolution, and Reassurance. in Preferences, institutions, and rational choice 249–265 (Clarendon Press, 1995).
41.
Parsons, S. D. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. vol. Critical political studies (Continuum, 2005).
42.
Schelling, T. C. Thermostats, Lemons and other Families of Models. in Micromotives and macrobehavior vol. Fels lectures on public policy analysis 81–133 (Norton, 1978).
43.
Rival views of Market society. in Rival views of market society, and other recent essays 77–101 (Harvard University Press, 1992).
44.
Hirschman, A. O. Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic. in A propensity to self-subversion 9–44 (Harvard University Press, 1995).
45.
A. H. Birch. Economic Models in Political Science: The Case of ‘Exit, Voice, and Loyalty’. British Journal of Political Science 5, 69–82 (1975).
46.
Dowding, K., John, P., Mergoupis, T. & Vugt, M. Exit, voice and loyalty: Analytic and empirical developments. European Journal of Political Research 37, 469–495 (2000).
47.
Chong, D. Collective action and the civil rights movement. vol. American politics and political economy series (University of Chicago Press, 1991).
48.
Hirschman, A. O. Shifting involvements: private interest and public action. (Martin Robertson, 1982).
49.
Adelman, J. Worldly philosopher: the odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman. (Princeton University Press, 2013).
50.
Laver, M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. (Sage, 1997).
51.
Dowding, K. Is it Rational to Vote? Five Types of Answer and a Suggestion. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 7, 442–459 (2005).
52.
Blais, A. To vote or not to vote?: the merits and limits of rational choice theory. (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000).
53.
Brennan, G. & Lomasky, L. The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington: Toward a Smithian Theory of Electoral Behavior. Economics and Philosophy 1, (1985).
54.
Hindmoor, A. & Taylor, B. Rational choice. vol. Political analysis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
55.
Parsons, S. The Rationality of Voting: A Response to Dowding. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 8, 295–298 (2006).
56.
Parsons, S. D. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. vol. Critical political studies (Continuum, 2005).
57.
Laver, M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. (Sage, 1997).
58.
Downs, A. An economic theory of democracy. (Harper and Row, 1957).
59.
Downs, A. An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. Journal of Political Economy 65, 135–150 (1957).
60.
Hindmoor, A. Reading Downs: New Labour and. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 7, 402–417 (2005).
61.
Heffernan, R. New Labour and Thatcherism: political change in Britain. (Palgrave, 2001).
62.
Hindmoor, A. & Taylor, B. Rational choice. vol. Political analysis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
63.
Parsons, S. D. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. vol. Critical political studies (Continuum, 2005).
64.
Laver, M. Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. (Sage, 1997).
65.
Hindmoor, A. & Taylor, B. Rational choice. vol. Political analysis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
66.
Parsons, S. D. Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction. vol. Critical political studies (Continuum, 2005).
67.
Buchanan, J. M., Wagner, R. E. & Burton, J. The consequences of Mr Keynes: an analysis of the misuse of economic theory for political profiteering, with proposals for constitutional disciplines. vol. Hobart paper; 78 (Institute of Economic Affairs, 1978).
68.
Buchanan, J. M. & Tollison, R. D. The Theory of public choice--II. (University of Michigan Press, 1984).
69.
Dunleavy, P. Bureaucrats, Budgets and the Growth of the State: Reconstructing an Instrumental Model. British Journal of Political Science 15, (1985).
70.
‘Rules Rather than Discretion: the Inconsistency of Optimal Plans’, Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 83, no. 3, 1977, pp. 473-91. https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/research/prescott/papers/rulesdiscretion.pdf?la=en.
71.
Wickham-Jones, M. ‘Anticipating Social Democracy, Pre-empting Anticipations Economic-Policy-Making in the British Labour Party, 1987-1992’. Politics and society 23, 465–494 (1995).
72.
MacLean, N. Democracy in chains: the deep history of the radical right’s stealth plan for America. (Scribe, 2017).