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A. Hindmoor and B. Taylor, Rational choice, Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=6234556
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S. Parsons, Rational Choice and Politics : A Critical Introduction. [Online]. Available: https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction/
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D. Chong, Collective action and the civil rights movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=1977975
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W. Poundstone, Prisoner’s dilemma. New York: Anchor Books, 1993.
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M. Laver, Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. London: Sage, 1997 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393
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S. D. Parsons, Rational choice and politics: a critical introduction, vol. Critical political studies. London: Continuum, 2005 [Online]. Available: https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/rational-choice-and-politics-a-critical-introduction
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E. Hauptmann, Putting choice before democracy: a critique of rational choice theory. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996.
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K. R. Monroe, The heart of altruism: perceptions of a common humanity. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996.
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A. Sen, ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory’, in Scientific models and man, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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N. P. Barry, The new right. London: Croom Helm.
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M. Olson, ‘Collective Action’, in The invisible hand, M. Milgate and P. Newman, Eds. London: Macmillan Reference, 1989, pp. 61–69.
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M. Olson, The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=4642422
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M. A. Boyer, International cooperation and public goods : opportunities for the Western Alliance. Baltimore ; London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
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D. Chong, Collective action and the civil rights movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=1977975
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P. Dunleavy, Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice : economic explanations in political science. London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group [Online]. Available: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315835228
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M. Olson, The rise and decline of nations : economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. New Haven ; London: Yale University Press.
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‘Prisoners Dilemma’, in Game theory, vol. The new Palgrave, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989, pp. 199–204.
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A. Hindmoor and B. Taylor, Rational choice, Second edition., vol. Political analysis. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
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M. Laver, Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice. London: Sage, 1997 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bristol/detail.action?docID=483393
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K. Dowding, ‘Is it Rational to Vote? Five Types of Answer and a Suggestion’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 442–459, 2005, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2005.00188.x.
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