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Welcome – Blackboard Learn. https://www.ole.bris.ac.uk/webapps/portal/execute/tabs/tabAction?tab_tab_group_id=_17_1.
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POLI22202 Unit Summary. https://www.bris.ac.uk/unit-programme-catalogue/UnitDetails.jsa?ayrCode=19%2F20&unitCode=POLI22202.
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Philosophy & Public Affairs.
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Politics, Philosophy & Economics.
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Contemporary Political Theory.
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Journal of Political Philosophy.
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Social Philosophy and Policy.
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/.
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Simmons, J. The Theories. In Is There a Duty to Obey the Law?; Cambridge University Press, 2005; pp 102–120. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809286.007.
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